Sunday, August 4, 2013

NIOSH 5 part 1 - Improper risk assessment or poor size up report.







The number one reason on the NIOSH list is improper risk assessment or poor size up report. Why is this? What does the size up have to do with our survivability? Well id argue a number of reasons but one of the main reasons i see would be getting tunnel vision and missing pertinent hazards and things we may know if looking at a picture but in the rush of the fight we miss.

A proper size up performed by the first arriving officer or command will let any incoming units get a mental picture of what to expect and mentally prepare themselves in advance for any pertinent information. 

Taking the time to read the fire and take in a full picture of what were dealing with will give us a good timeframe of what has happened, whats happening, and whats going to happen.

The other half of this say improper risk assessment. What this means is not weighing risk vs gain on every tactical move we make. And this doesnt occur just once. This has to be an ongoing process from beginning to end. With a major contributor to interior deaths is being caught in a flashover or backdraft,  An exterior officer making continual risk assessments regarding the conditions will greatly benefit the interior team.

        A proper on scene size up report will provide dispatch and any incoming units with pertinent information regarding the scene. A thorough size up will allow incoming units to continue mentally preparing for the task at hand. The average size up report does not convey a great deal of information: what is most commonly said is: __________ on scene of _________, nothing showing, will advise, __________ has command. Or _________ on scene of __________, confirmed working fire, __________ has command. 

These minimal size ups do little for the advantage of incoming units. A properly done size up can set the tone for the rest of the incident.
Common components of an initial scene size up should include:
  1. Correct address
  2. Number of floors
  3. Type of construction
  4. Type of occupancy
  5. Conditions found
  6. Additional resources needed
  7. Actions to be taken
  8. Assume command
1. Correct address: On occasion dispatch may either have the wrong address, relay an incorrect address, or simply have a vicinity. A correct address will assist dispatch and all units still enroute. This is especially helpful when dispatched to a smoke investigation only to find a working fire. A good example of an incident I was on, The callers were calling from across the street and advised they could see flames behind a hospital above the tree line. Initially it was unknown as to if this was a large commercial fire or a residential fire. Upon arrival a residential structure was found to be fully involved adjacent to the hospital and a more accurate address was given. This made a difference here due to the fact that a response for the abandoned hospital burning would be quite different from a single story residential building, and this allowed incoming crews to adjust their thinking to what there is as opposed to what there could be.
2. Number of floors: Communicating the number of floors will allow units to anticipate access issues, tools needed, assignments, and will be able to provide information regarding the need for a ladder truck.
3. Type of construction: The type of construction will directly influence the way the incident will be mitigated. Once again, this will allow incoming crews to anticipate particular tools they may need.

4. Type of occupancy: The type of occupancy along with other variables will determine the possible need for rescue, contents of a structure, layout, and any known hazards specific to that type.
5. Conditions found: Painting a picture involving the previous four points along with the conditions found will give crews a relatively good idea of what they are going to be facing.
6. Additional resources needed: The need for additional resources should not be delayed. Upon arrival a risk vs gain assessment should quickly be performed and if any resources may be needed that are currently not enroute, then the call should be made immediately. This is a common area for pride to step in and the decision to call for help may be blinded by ones pride in his department or crew. It is always safer to have help enroute and cancel them, than to need them and not have them. 
7. Actions to be taken: Relay to the crews what the initial crew will be doing. Communicate whether an offensive or defensive attack will be initiated, what line is being pulled, where the team will make entry, etc. Also relay what the second, third, and so on arriving units assignments will be, such as securing a water supply, rescue needs, exposure concerns, truck functions, etc.
8. Call command: The first officer on scene (or most senior) needs to establish command. As its known, command needs to refrain from suppression activities. However the need for a proactive IC may be necessary depending on the situation. If the IC must be involved, then command should be passed off as soon as possible to a person who can be a dedicated IC separated from the scene ongoings who can remain outside for the duration of the incident.

The key here is to practice on size ups. Wether youre a rookie or a seasoned veteran, a proper size up will benefit everyone on scene. If you practice your size ups and become confident youll find yourself making more accurate decisions for yourself and your team.

Take a moment and read my good friend Dave Werners recent write up regarding size ups here:


Remember to keep your head on a swivel and continually re-evaluate your conditions. 

Numbers dont lie...

Numbers dont lie...

Currently Per the USFA as of August 4th 2013, the fire service has lost 70 members to LODDs. 2012 saw a total of 83. Let me remind you its only august and were 13 short of last years totals. Heres the link if you want to review the information.

http://apps.usfa.fema.gov/firefighter-fatalities/

So what I would like to do is embark in a 5 part series, the focus will be the top 5 leading killers of firefighters on the fireground, commonly referred to as the NIOSH 5.

The NIOSH 5 are listed in order as:

1. Improper risk assessment (poor size-up).
2. Lack of incident command.
3. Lack of accountability.
4. Inadequate communications.
5. Lack of SOGs or failure to follow established SOGs.

The purpose of this series is to bring some basic knowledge of the basics that are killing us and maybe produce some ideas regarding how to help reduce the numbers associated with them.

Saturday, August 3, 2013

Last shift fire.

So I havent been able to blog here lately. A lot has been going on with getting ready to move, moving, and settling in with the people im staying with during the first few months of recruit school. But now that I have full access to Wifi where im staying ill be able to post a lot more often.

My last shift with my previous department went how many hope a last shift goes, either when moving on or retiring. Ran a few medical calls, got a good workout in, had a decent MVA, and the icing on the cake...a working fire in our first due. It couldnt get any better...

The fire we ran, I was able to learn from, which is always a good thing.

Quick run down of the incident: Dispatched first due confirmed working fire, arrived on scene riding backwards on a four man engine. Presented with a single story, wood frame construction, single family dwelling with heavy fire showing from the BC corner and smoke pushing from the rest of the structure. I had my own personal irons and a fiberglass pike pole from the engine. My partner has the hose. All occupants accounted for.

There were a few difficulties getting the straps from the cleveland load undone which caused a delay in advancing the line.

We attempted to make a push through the front door and were forced to retreat midway through the structure due to rapidly changing conditions in smoke and fire, and after a quick evaluation, the interior had all the signs and symptoms of an imminent flashover. We were in forceful, thick, black, turbulent smoke with extremely high temperatures, and signs of flame rollover above our heads. I made the call to back out and punt. The exterior back up line was then used to knock the bulk down from the window and we made entry a second time, still facing heavy fire we were able to get water to the seat the second time around.

I attempted to pull the ceiling above us, but was faced with what felt like concrete. It was older tongue and groove with 3/4" sheetrock over top for the walls and ceiling. The fiberglass pike pole didnt have enough butt behind it to get a purchase point. I could only pull a slat here and there. Barely enough to check for extension.

We began overhaul and finished hitting the hotspots. The entire interior of the house burned completely due to pyrolysis and was evident it was near flashing. If one or two windows had given way or water hadnt been applied in the next few seconds, im sure we would have been switching to defensive there shortly.

My partner was transported to the ER after the fire for burned ears due to the extreme temperatures we faced before backing out.

Some of the things i learned:

-When using the cleveland load with straps, be sure the straps are easy to remove with and without gloves.

-Learned what the interior signs of an imminent flashover look like and felt confident in my call.

-Learned a fiberglass pike pole works for newer construction but doesnt fair well to older beadboard. A NY hook or anything with some length and weight to it fairs better.

-Learned that sometimes looks can be deceiving. This started as a room and contents that ended up pushing us out. Older construction holds alot of heat and burns much different than newer construction.

-They call it black fire for a reason.

-Listen to your partner and make calls accordingly, If they say theyre burning its time to leave. Sometimes you have to go to plan B.



You can see here, that no fire was ever visible on the front, but the smoke was as such a temperature it burned the whole front of the structure as if it was rolling out flames. The fire was actually all the way in the rear of the house.